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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




- a n d - CASE NO. C-4880 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ICHABOD CRANE 
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CSEA UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (WILLIAM F. SHEEHAN of counsel), for Petitioner 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEUX, LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS of counsel), 
for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Ichabod Crane Registered 
Nurses Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its petition to fragment the title of nurse from an existing unit of 
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noninstructional school personnel represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Ichabod Crane Central School 
District CSEA Unit (CSEA) and to be certified as the representative of a separate unit of 
nurses employed by the Ichabod Crane Central School District (District). The ALJ 
determinedJhat_the_nurses_had_notj}em^^ 
existing unit and had not shown that their interests had received inadequate 
representation from CSEA.1 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in 
applying our "fragmentation" standard because the nurses have not been represented 
by CSEA for more than the term of two collective bargaining agreements. According to 
the Association, because CSEA's representation is not "long-standing", our initial 
uniting standard of community of interest should have been used. The Association 
further argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that the record facts evidence 
inadequate representation by CSEA and a conflict of interest between the interests of 
the nurses and the other employees in the noninstructional unit. CSEA supports the 
ALJ's decision; the District has filed no response to the exceptions.2 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALJ's decision, in part, but reverse 
her dismissal of the petition. 
1
 Because of the dismissal of the petition on other grounds, the ALJ did not reach 
the issue of whether the Association is an employee organization within the meaning of 
the Act, which was raised by CSEA. 
2The District has taken no position with respect to the merits of the petition. 
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FACTS 
There are four registered nurses employed by the District, one each at the 
primary school, the elementary school, the middle school and the high school. Although 
there is no record evidence regarding the impetus behind the placement of the title of 
nurse-in4he-CSEA-bargaining-unit,nurses have-been-represented-by-CSEA^ince-at—— 
least 1991, and there have been two collective bargaining agreements negotiated 
which covered the nurses.3 Other titles in the noninstructional unit represented by 
CSEA include custodians, cleaners, mechanics, cafeteria workers, office workers, bus 
dispatchers, bus drivers, transportation aides, teacher aides and monitors. 
The nurses all have college degrees, two with Bachelor's of Science degrees 
and two with Associate's degrees. Registered nurses must have at least an Associate's 
degree and must pass a New York State certification exam to be licensed. They must 
renew their licenses every four years. In order to do so, nurses must participate in an 
annual update of their first aid and CPR certifications. The nurses also take special 
courses each year in subjects such as drug abuse and child abuse. Registered nurses 
are subject to the provisions of the New York State Nurse Practice Act. All the nurses 
carry professional malpractice insurance.4 
3The 1991-1993 collective bargaining agreement does not identify the titles in the 
unit, but the 1993-1996 collective bargaining agreement includes the title of nurse in the 
salary schedule. 
4Currently, the nurses obtain and pay for such insurance themselves. 
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The nurses are the primary health care providers in their assigned school 
buildings. The high school nurse, who is also president of the Association, testified that 
she regularly sees between 20 and 30 students a day in the high school health office. 
The students are seen for illness, such as nausea and fever, and injuries requiring first 
aid,_such_asxuts,-bruises, spra in^ 
nurse testified that she sees from 40 to 80 students a day for illness or first aid and that 
she contacts the parents of from 10 to 40 students each day with respect to students' 
illnesses or injuries. Likewise, the middle school nurse testified that she sees 
approximately 40 students each day. 
The high school nurse also regularly administers medicine, such as Ritalin, 
inhalers, seizure medicine, antibiotics and pain relievers, to students, most of whom are 
able to self-medicate. The primary school nurse also administers medicine to students 
but, because of their age, she actually medicates the students.5 
Records are kept on each student who is seen by the nurse. The high school 
nurse also regularly counsels students, primarily female students, about health 
concerns and will intercede with other agencies, where necessary, on their behalf. All 
nurses are required to report incidents of child abuse to the proper authorities and may 
be called upon by the principal to interview and examine a student who the principal or 
5The nurses testified about the special care certain students require, such as 
diabetic students who require glucose monitoring and the administration of insulin and 
students who have feeding tubes and require medication and feeding. 
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a teacher suspects has been abused. Likewise, the nurses may be directed by the 
principal to observe a student who is suspected of using drugs. 
The high school nurse annually conducts vision tests and scoliosis screenings 
for each of the approximately 700 high school students and conducts hearing tests and 
physicaUexamsjfor_each-oltheJenth_grade students_and any_new_students.JIhe_primary 
school nurse, must check immunization records and take health histories of all new 
students and meet with parents with respect to those issues. The nurses also identify 
communicable diseases that may be present in the school and notify parents and staff if 
there has been an outbreak of such illnesses. 
Nurses meet regularly with teachers, principals and the special education 
committee to discuss students' needs.6 They also have daily contact with the school 
psychologist. The middle school nurse testified that she serves on a child study team 
which also includes the social worker, guidance counselor and assistant principal. The 
nurses report directly to their building principals. They are also under the jurisdiction of 
the District Medical Board which is made up of the school doctors and which annually 
sets the first aid guidelines for the District. 
In 1995, CSEA began negotiations with the District for a successor agreement to 
the 1993-1996 collective bargaining agreement. After protracted negotiations, CSEA 
and the District concluded a five-year collective bargaining agreement. The nurses put 
forward no specific contract proposals for the 1996-2000 collective bargaining 
6For example, the middle school nurse works with the social worker in assisting 
students who have school phobia to cope with their anxieties. 
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agreement.7 Apart from receiving the other benefits negotiated for unit employees, the 
nurses received a $.75 an hour increase to their salaries effective July 1, 1999. CSEA 
originally had proposed an annual stipend of $200 for each nurse in lieu of the payment 
of professional dues and fees but agreed to accept the $.75 per hour increase offered 
by4he_DJstrict.XSEA-also_obiained_b^ 
would have benefitted one of the nurses in return for giving back a dual coverage option 
that had benefitted unit employees who were not nurses. 
The record also shows that in the last few years, CSEA had obtained 
subscriptions at the school libraries for professional journals requested by the nurses. 
CSEA also was instrumental in removing attendance duties from one nurse's schedule 
and in seeing that an aide was provided during that nurse's lunch period. CSEA offered 
to pursue the payment by the District of malpractice insurance for the nurses, but the 
nurses withdrew their request for such a benefit. Finally, support and representation 
were offered to a nurse who had been involved in a heated meeting with a student's 
parents. 
Other concerns articulated by the nurses were not brought to CSEA's attention 
by the nurses or, having been raised with CSEA, were not pursued by the nurses. 
7The nurses testified that they had not received contract proposal solicitations 
from CSEA, which CSEA alleged had been sent to all unit members. The nurses did 
prepare a chart for CSEA to utilize during fact-finding which compared their salaries 
with nurses in neighboring school districts. CSEA chose not to present the chart at fact-
finding because the years during which those salaries were paid were not provided, 
there were other titles besides nurse included in the chart and some of the salaries 
listed were less than those received by the nurses at the District. CSEA subsequently 
did not accept the fact finder's report. 
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These include confidentiality, continuing professional education, office staffing and 
substitutes, uniformity in office protocol, medical concerns and the effect of new 
legislation and court decisions. 
DISCUSSION 
= Although not decided by the ALJ, because of our determination on the 
fragmentation issue, infra, we must first reach the issue of the status of the Association 
as an employee organization. 
As relevant herein, §201.5 of the Act defines ah employee organization as "an 
organization of any kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of terms and 
conditions of employment of public employees. . . . " The Board has taken a liberal 
approach to the definition of an employee organization in this regard. For example, in 
Enlarged City School District of the City of Saratoga Springs,8 we affirmed the decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) finding 
that the petitioner therein was an employee organization because a name for the 
petitioner was adopted, an interim president had been elected, the members discussed 
a constitution, and the petitioner sought to represent public employees to improve their 
terms and conditions of employment.9 
814 PERB 1J3080 (1981), confd, 90 AD2d 114, 15 PERB 1J7032 (3d Dep't 1982). 
9See also Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 15 PERB 
1J3041 (1982); Half Hollow Hills Community Library Dist, 13 PERB 1J3104, affg 13 
PERB H4050 (1980); State of New York, 1 PERB 1J399.85 (1968). 
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In this matter, the Association has adopted a name, elected officers, established 
membership criteria and adopted a statement of purpose. The Association has a stated 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of employment for the registered 
nurses employed by the District. These factors satisfy the indicia necessary to 
demonstrateJ:haUhe-AssociationJs-an_emp!oyee_Q^ 
Act.10 
Turning to the merits of the fragmentation petition, the remaining issue, as 
framed by the parties, to be determined is whether there should be a separate unit for 
nurses or whether they should continue in the noninstructional unit.11 In several 
previous cases, both the Board and the Director have determined that nurses are not 
appropriately fragmented from existing units where there has not been inadequate 
representation or proof of a conflict of interest.12 For example, the Board held in 
Chautauqua County Board of Cooperative Educational Services™ that despite a felt 
community of interest between the school nurses and the health-related professionals 
included in a different bargaining unit, where there was no evidence of ineffective 
10See also Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 31 PERB P057 (1998); Elba Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 16 PERB 1J3003 (1983); Lakeland Cent. Sch. Dist. of Scrub Oak, 12 PERB 1J301.7 
(1979), aff'g, 11 PERB 1J4073 (1978). 
11
 See Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J4067 (1990). 
12See, e.g., County of Cattaraugus, 31 PERB fl3048 (1998); County of Erie, 
18 PERB |[3045 (1985) (subsequent history omitted); Chautauqua County Bd. of Coop. 
Educ. Serv., 15 PERB 1(3126 (1982); Kenmore-North Tonawanda Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 24 PERB 1J4025 (1991); County of Oswego, 23 PERB TJ4054 (1990). 
AZSupra, note 12. 
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negotiations on behalf of the nurses in the noninstructional unit, the stability of the 
existing unit structure would not be disturbed. Likewise, in County of Rockland,14 the 
Board dismissed a petition to fragment nurses from a county-wide unit, even where the 
nurses expressed that they felt no community of interest with the other employees in 
theajnitandj/vhereJhereJ/vas-Som^ 
been as responsive as it might have been to the nurses' specific concerns. In those 
cases, the Board utilized the standard first articulated in Town ofSmithtown15 which 
disfavors disturbing the status quo absent good cause shown. 
The Association presented evidence on the conduct of negotiations for the last 
collective bargaining agreement between CSEA and the District, which it asserts 
establishes inadequate representation by CSEA. We affirm the ALJ's decision that the 
evidence presented by the Association was not sufficient to establish that the nurses 
had been systematically and intentionally ignored by CSEA so as to warrant their 
fragmentation from the overall unit of noninstructional employees.16 
10 PERB H3014 (1977). 
;8 PERB P015 (1975). It should be noted that in Smithtown, the unique blurring 
of the differences between white-collar and blue-collar employees in the existing unit 
was a decisive factor considered by the majority in the Board's decision, as was the 
long-standing history of effective and meaningful negotiations. The dissent argued that 
the doctrine of most appropriate unit was "stretched" by the majority's decision to find 
appropriate an existing unit that would not have been the unit found most appropriate in 
a case involving initial uniting. 
™State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreational and Historical Pres. 
Comm'n), 22 PERB fl3043 (1989). 
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Were we to limit our analysis to inadequate representation, we would affirm the 
ALJ and dismiss the petition. However, we take this opportunity to address the uniting 
concerns raised by the Association's petition. 
The Association argues that we should employ the standard used in initial unit 
determinations4o-decide-this case.HXhe-Association-argues_that if the^community-of 
interest" standard is used, we would find that the petitioned-for separate unit of nurses 
is most appropriate. 
From PERB's first year, in initial uniting cases, separate units of nurses were 
found to be most appropriate. In considering whether nurses should be included in an 
overall unit of county employees or should be placed in a separate unit, it was held that 
"nurses form a cohesive group having a substantially different community of interest 
from that of all other employees."18 In Putnam Valley Central School District, it was 
determined that, in a school setting, the same standard should apply.19 There, however, 
17The Association premises its argument not only on the felt community of 
interest between the nurses but on the fact that CSEA's representation of the nurses 
has not been "long-standing" enough to compel the use of the fragmentation standard. 
We do not reach the second basis for the Association's exceptions, in support of our 
decision, infra., beyond noting that the nurses' inclusion since 1991 in the CSEA 
bargaining unit is certainly "long-standing". See Chautauqua County BOCES, supra, 
note 12. 
^County of Putnam, 2 PERB 1J4012, at 4202 (1969), citing to Chemung County, 
1 PERB 1J415 (1968). See also County of Sullivan, 1 PERB 1J399.80 (1968); County of 
Rensselaer, 1 PERB 1(399.73 (1968). See also County of Fulton, 4 PERB 1(4002 (1971) 
(nurses fragmented from a unit of nonprofessional employees to create a separate unit 
of nurses); Jefferson County, 5 PERB 1(4012 (1972) (nurses fragmented from a unit of 
professional and supervisory employees and placed in a separate unit). 
197 PERB 114025, aff'd, 7 PERB 1J3055 (1974). 
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it was held that if a petition sought to include nurses with professional or pedagogical 
employees or noninstructional employees, the most appropriate unit placement of 
nurses would be with other professional employees. In the years following those early 
decisions, when the issue of initial unit placement of nurses was before either the 
Director_orJhe_Board,jaurse 
other professional employees.20 
But, in those cases where nurses were included in a unit of nonprofessional or 
noninstructional employees which were later the subject of fragmentation petitions 
seeking to remove the nurses and place them in a separate unit or in a unit of other 
professional employees, the fragmentation standard which had grown out of Town of 
Smithtown, supra, was utilized. Invariably, nurses were continued in the non-
professional or noninstructional units that had not been devised by PERB. In those 
cases, the Board and the Director gave controlling weight to the standard that 
20See, e.g., Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3029 (1995); Carthage 
Cent Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J3085 (1983); Caledonia-Mumford Cent. Sch. Dist, 
25 PERB 1J4043 (1992); York Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 PERB 1J4044 (1992); Jamestown City 
Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J4036 (1988); Hannibal Cent Sch. Dist, 18 PERB H4031 (1985); 
Akron Cent Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J4054 (1984); Charlotte Valley Cent Sch. Dist, 
16 PERB 1J4083 (1983); Malveme Union Free Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J4057 (1983). See 
also Charlotte Valley Cent Sch. Dist., 16 PERB 1f4083, at 4122 (1983), where the 
Director held that the "cases make clear that absent a history of negotiations or 
preference for separate representation. PERB has given dispositive weight to the closer 
community of interest between school nurses and teachers." (emphasis added) See 
also Lindenhurst Union Free Sch. Dist, 10 PERB 1J4023 (1977). 
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fragmentation of existing bargaining units will not be granted in the absence of 
compelling evidence of the need to do so.21 
The Association has urged us to utilize the uniting standard articulated in our 
early cases and still used in cases involving initial uniting of nurses: community of 
-i-n-terest4n-a cohesive-group-having-substantially-differentinterests-than-those-otother, 
nonprofessional, employees. This Board has not had the opportunity to consider 
whether the unique professional responsibilities and duties of nurses warrant their 
removal from units which also include nonprofessional employees.22 We now consider 
the policy implications of the reliance of prior Boards on the conflict of interest standard 
and not the community of interest standard in cases involving the fragmentation of 
nurses from existing units and we conclude that nurses are not properly placed in units 
of nonprofessional or noninstructional employees.23 
As is evident from the record before us, nurses are required to have a college 
education, meet certification and licensing requirements, participate in continuing 
professional education and are subject to changing professional requirements brought 
See Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist, 22 PERB P014 (1989); State of New 
York, 21 PERB ^3050 (1988); Chautauqua County BOCES, supra note 12. 
22County of Cattaraugus, supra note 12, sought to fragment all employees, not 
just the nurses, of the county nursing home from an overall unit of County employees. 
The petition, filed by the County, was based upon administrative convenience. Because 
of the identity of the petitioner, the nature of the unit sought and the economic factors 
upon which the petition was based, we dismissed the petition and did not treat with the 
status of nurses in either the existing or proposed unit. 
See County of Orange, 14 PERB 1T3060 (1981). 
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about by legislation and court decisions. They have daily, direct contact with students, 
teachers, administrators, parents and other health care professionals. Nurses clearly 
share an occupational identity and professional interests. It has been recognized, 
based upon their education, training and professional responsibilities and duties, that 
they-are-appropriately_placed4ogethera^ 
working conditions and/or benefit level.24 We here determine that the duties of nurses 
establish "an arguable unique community of interest and/or conflict of interest with 
other, [nonprofessional], employees...who may not have any similar duties."25 
To the extent that earlier decisions have dismissed petitions seeking to fragment 
nurses in reliance upon the standard that existing units will not be fragmented absent 
compelling need to do so, they are overruled.26 We are also mindful, as we noted in 
County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County,2J that "any fragmentation ordered in this 
case cannot be confined logically to [nurses] and will lead inexorably to similar requests 
See, e.g., County of Erie, 18 PERB U4074, on remand from 18 PERB 1J3045, 
aff'g in part, 18 PERB TJ4020 (1985) (subsequent history omitted). 
25See County of Dutchess and Dutchess County Sheriff, 26 PERB fl3069 at 3130 
(1993). 
26
"ln doing so, we note that we are not bound by the earlier decisions. A labor 
relations agency may reappraise its prior decisions and overrule them when new 
insights gained from practical experience with past principles change its understanding 
of how to protect the statutory rights of employees." County of Orange, supra note 23, 
at 3100, n.5 and cases cited therein. See also Charles A. Field Delivery Service, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 66 NY2d 516 (1985). 
2729 PERB P 0 3 1 , at 3070 (1996), cont'd, 247 AD2d 671, 31 PERB 1J7004 (3d 
Dep't1998). 
Board - C-4880 -14 
by any other employees who can reasonably claim some unique community of interest. 
We will decide such issues as appropriate should they arise in the future. However, 
nothing in this decision is intended to hold or suggest that we are abandoning our 
fragmentation standards generally." 
—Based^on-the-foregoing^the-Associationls-exceptions-relatingJoJhe ALJls— 
determination that there had been adequate representation of the nurses are dismissed 
and the Association's exceptions relating to the community of interest standard are 
granted. The ALJ's decision is, therefore, affirmed, except as to the dismissal of the 
petition; in that respect, it is reversed. 
We, therefore, find that the following unit is most appropriate:28 
Included: All full-time registered nurses. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
This case is hereby remanded to the Director for purposes of ascertaining the 
unit employees' choice of bargaining representative pursuant to §207.2 of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
% 
/^Ma&^AbboK Member 
f i)ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
28See Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., supra note 11; County of Jefferson, supra 
note 18. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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- and - CASE NO. U-19691 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
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NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ANDREA R. LURIE, GENERAL COUNSEL (LAUREN P. DESOLE of counsel), 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the State of New York-Unified 
Court System (UCS) to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). CSEA alleged that UCS violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally issued an 
Administrative Order (Order) on December 29, 1997, amending Part 108 of the Rules of 
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the Chief Administrator of the Courts (Rules) relating to the rates of payment for 
transcripts furnished to private litigants by court reporters.1,2 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The ALJ's findings of fact are extensive and detailed. We, therefore, adopt them 
for the purposes of our decision and summarize them, as here relevant, as follows. 
CSEA represents persons in various court reporter titles who are employed by 
the UCS. The job duties of the reporters, as set forth in title standards applicable to 
) 
1The original charge alleged violations of §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the Act and 
was consolidated for hearing with several other improper practice charges brought by 
several employee organizations representing court reporters in different bargaining 
units. PERB's Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
determined that the (a) and (c) charges were deficient and processed only the (d) 
violation. No exceptions were taken to this ruling and, as such, we need not reach that 
issue. On June 11, 2000, the ALJ issued her decision in this case. On June 22, 2000, 
the employee organizations, except the CSEA, executed a stipulation of 
discontinuance. 
2
"The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is, by virtue of that position, the Chief 
Judge of the State of New York (Chief Judge). The Chief Judge appoints the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Courts (Chief Administrative Judge) to oversee the daily 
administration and operation of UCS and perform duties delegated by the Chief Judge 
and required by law. The Administrative Board of the Courts (Administrative Board) 
consists of the Chief Judge and the presiding justices of each of the four Appellate 
Divisions of Supreme Court, (footnote omitted). The Chief Judge consults with the 
Administrative Board concerning the establishment of administrative standards and 
policy to be utilized throughout the court system." State of New York (Unified Court 
System), 30 PERB fl3067, at 3165 (1997). 
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their positions, focus primarily on the preparation of transcripts at hearings, trials, 
arraignments and other proceedings, for the purpose of making an accurate record.3 
The Judiciary Law also requires reporters to furnish transcripts to private parties 
or their attorneys as well as the courts.4 The authority for the fees allowed by law for 
transGripts4s4ound4n the GiviLRraGtice Lawand-Rules (GPLR)at §80Q2^The language 
of this statute has remained unchanged since 19845 and was the product of collective 
negotiations resulting in a Memorandum of Understanding dated November 16, 1983. 
Those negotiations also produced the rate to be charged to the UCS for transcripts.6 It 
also produced the rate to be charged to private parties for a transcript copy "unless 
3See also §§299 through 302 of the New York State Judiciary Law for reporters' 
duties to furnish the official transcript of proceedings. 
4Section 302 specifically provides: 
Every stenographer in a court of record must, upon request, 
furnish, with all reasonable diligence, to the defendant in a 
criminal case, or a party, or his attorney in a civil cause, a 
copy, written out at length from his stenographic notes, of 
the testimony and proceedings, or a part thereof, upon the 
trial or hearing, upon payment, by the person requiring 
same, of the fees allowed by law. 
5Section 8002 specifically provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed or provided by law, a stenographer 
is entitled, for a copy fully written out from his stenographic 
notes of testimony or other proceedings taken in a court, 
and furnished upon request to a party or his attorney, to the 
fee set forth in the rules promulgated by the chief 
administrator of the courts. 
6These are transcripts which are "expedited" or "daily" copies. Regular copies 
are provided at the end of the proceedings free of charge to the judges. Judiciary 
Law §299. 
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otherwise agreed", called the "default rate", which the parties agreed would be set forth 
in the Rules.7 The Memorandum further provided that the Rules shall not be modified 
except through collective negotiations. 
The Administrative Board is responsible for adopting the administrative rules and 
isthe governing body-of4he-court-system.—On-December-29,-1^9Z^the-Chief 
Administrative Judge issued an Order, implemented on December 31, 1997, which set 
forth guidelines establishing maximum rates to be charged by court reporters to private 
parties for transcripts, set a time limit for the production of an expedited copy and 
mandated written agreements between court reporters and private parties be on a form 
prescribed by the Chief Administrative Judge. The Order was issued without 
negotiations with CSEA. 
ALJ DECISION 
The ALJ determined that UCS's Order of December 29, 1997 contravened its 
duty to negotiate and violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The ALJ rejected UCS's waiver 
defense based upon the management rights and zipper clauses in the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. She found the language of these two clauses to be too broad to 
support UCS's defense that CSEA bargained away certain protected rights at issue. 
The ALJ focused on UCS's mission defense, to wit, the subject matter of the 
instant charge was a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. In dismissing this defense, 
she balanced the employer's interests against those of the employees. She concluded 
7The rate established as of July 1, 1986 was $1,375 per page. 
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that the Order of December 29, 1997 had little bearing on UCS's mission of ensuring 
that private parties have access to the court record, but instead went directly to the 
issue of the reporter's compensation and earnings. Thus, she found the employees' 
interest outweighed that of UCS.8 
— tastlyT-she-GonGluded-that-UGS-s-unilateralHmposition-of the disputed Order 
violated the Act because the content of the Order related to terms and conditions of 
employment which are mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, UCS points to numerous factual and legal errors resulting from 
the ALJ's lack of appreciation of UCS's mission and the necessity to promulgate the 
December 29, 1997 Order. 
UCS also objects to that part of the ALJ's order that directs a "make whole" 
remedy on the grounds that such relief is speculative at best. CSEA supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
DISCUSSION 
In McCoy v. Helsby,9 it was determined that the Act applied to nonjudicial 
employees of the Unified Court System. That being the case, UCS may not, in the 
absence of a viable defense, unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment of 
the reporters. How did the Order of December 29, 1997 affect the court reporters' 
See County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB 1J3080 (1980). 
'28 NY2d 790, 4 PERB ^[7007 (1971). 
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terms and conditions of employment? The Order sets maximum rate "guidelines" to be 
used by reporters and private litigants in negotiating the page rate to be paid for the 
provision of transcripts. Whether truly just guidelines or whether the Order fixes the 
page rate, which may not be excepted, even though negotiated between the reporters 
and-private-litigants^the-reGord-evidenGes4hat4he-effeGt-of-the-Order-has been to-limit 
the amount of compensation received by reporters for a transcript provided to private 
litigants. As UCS ties the rate of compensation it pays reporters to their earnings from 
private transcript production and the production of those transcripts for private litigants 
is a job requirement of the reporters, it is clear that the Order directly affects the 
reporters' terms and conditions of employment. 
UCS argues that because of its mission, the Order was a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation. We have held that "[a]s a general proposition, an administrative work 
rule constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiation unless it has but a slight impact 
upon terms and conditions of employment or if it has a major impact upon managerial 
responsibilities that, by law or public policy, may not be shared."10 Thus, we have 
struck a balance between an employer's freedom to manage its affairs and the right of 
employees to negotiate their terms and conditions of employment.11,12 
^Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, New York, Inc., 13 PERB1J3082, at 3131 (1980), 
citing Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 636 F2d 550 (D.C. Circ. 1980). 
11See County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), 21 PERB 1J3014 (1988); 
State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 18 PERB P064 (1985). 
12
"The term 'terms and conditions of employment' means salaries, wages, hours 
and other terms and conditions of employment. . . ." Act, §201.4. 
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In Evans v. PERB,™ "the Office of Court Administration (OCA) arguefd] that the 
judicial branch of government has 'two missions'. . . ." Special term noted that OCA 
correctly asserted that the judiciary has the responsibility for impartial dispute 
resolution. The court disagreed with OCA when it argued that it had a separate and 
distinct— mission—whiGh-was-self-administration^The-Courtheld thaWhe-exclusive 
function of the judiciary as the third branch of government has been and continues to 
be the unbiased resolution of disputes, stating that "[t]he administrative bureaucracy 
was not created for a separate mission but solely to relieve the judiciary of its 
administrative duties, in order that judges would be better able to devote themselves to 
their constitutionally appointed task of rendering justice."14 
In this proceeding, UCS again attempts to justify its unilateral action by arguing a 
"dual" mission role. We disagree. UCS's exclusive mission is to dispense justice. 
UCS's exceptions focus on the complaints made to it by certain bar associations and 
others recommending changes in the rate structure. In making this argument, UCS 
ignores, among other things, the testimony of its own witness that the Part 108 rates in 
question are a subject of negotiations between the litigants or their attorneys and the 
reporters. 
We adopt the findings of the ALJ that the other subjects covered by the Order, 
i.e., rates for expedited copies and the requirement that a form be used, are mandatory 
subjects of negotiation.15 UCS's mission argument fails and the balance is weighed in 
13113 Misc2d 986, 15 PERB U7014, at 7024 (Supreme Ct. Alb. County 1982). 
14/d. 
15Transcript, p. 218. 
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favor of the right of court reporters to negotiate Part 108 transcript fees and the other 
terms and conditions unilaterally imposed by the December 29, 1997 Order. The effect 
on compensation and hours of work, as well as contractual problems revolving around 
the various rates charged by court reporters for outside work, transcends UCS' mission. 
Lastly—U-CS-excepts-to the-make whole^remedy-direGted-by-the-A-UI-on-the 
theory that it is purely speculative. The violation of the Act lies in the unilateral 
implementation of the December 29, 1997 Order.16 The specific fees that a certain 
court reporter may have charged under a given set of circumstances may affect the 
"make whole" remedy, but it is not material to our assessment of a violation.17 That the 
amount of money owed may prove difficult to ascertain does not warrant a finding that 
no "make whole" order is appropriate.18 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and UCS's 
exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that UCS: 
1. Rescind its December 29, 1997 amendments to Part 108 of the Rules of the 
Chief Administrator of the Courts. 
16ln fact, there is evidence in the record that fees that were negotiated between 
reporters and private litigants were reduced by the litigants, who accepted the 
maximum rate set forth in the Order. 
17See State of New York-Unified Court System, 28 PERB 1J3003 (1995); State of 
New York-Unified Court System, 28 PERB 1J3004 (1995). 
18See City of Troy, 29 PERB ^[3004 (1996); Village of Buchanan, 22 PERB 
113001 (1989); City of Rochester, 21 PERB H3040 (1988), cont'd, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 
PERB H7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
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2. Cease and desist from unilaterally establishing page rates for the production 
of transcripts for private litigants, the definition of expedited copy for the 
production of transcripts for private litigants, and reporting requirements 
regarding transcript production for private litigants. 
3—Make-unit^employees4/vhole-for-lost-compensation,^itany,_suffered_as-a 
result of the amendments to the Rules, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
post written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC^EMPLOYEES^FAIR EMPLOYMENT AGT 
we hereby notify the employees of the State of New York Unified Court System represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the State will: 
1. Rescind its December 29, 1997 amendments to Part 108 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of 
the Courts. 
2. Not unilaterally establish page rates for the production of transcripts for private litigants, the definition 
of expedited copy for the production of transcripts for private litigants, and reporting requirements 
regarding transcript production for private litigants. 
• ) 
3. Make unit employees whole for lost compensation, if any, suffered as a result of the amendments to 
the Rules, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
L J G i l . 6 C I D S O B B a S B B B D V B B B B B B B S a B B B a B g a a a B S B B B B B a B S B B B B a 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
1.. /Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20786 
COUNTY OF MONROE and MONROE 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondents. 
SAPERSTON & DAY, P.C. (PATRICK B. NAYLON of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
BARRY C. WATKINS, ESQ, for Respondent County of Monroe 
CHARLES M. PILATO, ESQ., for Respondent Monroe County Sheriff 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Monroe (County) and 
the Monroe County Sheriff (Sheriff) (collectively, Employer) and cross-exceptions filed 
by the Monroe County Sheriff Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Employer violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally discontinued 
the practice of allowing certain employees in the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS) of 
the Sheriffs Department (Department) represented by the PBA to use County-owned 
vehicles to travel to and from work in retaliation for the PBA's complaining about 
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changes in the use of flex-time by CIS employees.1 The ALJ dismissed the allegation 
that the Employer had violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally discontinued 
the past practice of employees utilizing County-owned vehicles for travel to and from 
work, finding that the use of the vehicles had been based upon a condition precedent.2 
The-County-excepts-to the-ALJ-s-determination4hat-its-decision4o-resGind4he 
use of certain vehicles by certain CIS employees was improperly motivated and was 
predicated upon the Association's complaint about changes in the use of flex-time. The 
County argues that, but for timing, there is no record evidence to support a finding that 
the County's decision was improperly motivated and that timing alone cannot support 
the finding of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) violations. Finally, the County argues that there 
were legitimate business reasons for the Sheriff's decision which the ALJ ignored. The 
Sheriff also excepts to the ALJ's finding of improper motivation for the same reasons 
articulated by the County. The County and the Sheriff otherwise support the ALJ's 
decision. 
1As used throughout the ALJ's decision, flex-time refers to a practice by which 
CIS employees who worked beyond their normal shift or were called in for additional 
duties would not put in for overtime pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement but 
would take the time they had accrued as compensatory time at their discretion at a later 
date. 
2The ALJ also dismissed the alleged §209-a.1(e) violation because the collective 
bargaining agreement between the Employer and the Association's predecessor 
employee organization, the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs Association, Inc., had not 
expired at the time of the actions complained of in the charge. No exceptions have 
been taken to this aspect of the ALJ's decision and we, therefore, do not reach it. 
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The Association's cross-exceptions are directed to the ALJ's finding that the 
Employer did not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when its practice allowing the use of 
cars by certain CIS officers was discontinued. The Association argues that the use of 
County vehicles was not conditional. The Association argues in support of the 
-remainder-of4he-ALJ-s-decision, ^— 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Use of County Vehicles 
The CIS is made up of several different units within the Department, including 
the warrants, vice, technical and major felony units.3 Officers in these units are 
stationed both at Department headquarters, which is located in downtown Rochester, 
and in suburban locations in the county, which are designated Zones A, B, and C. For 
various periods of time up to eight to ten years prior to March 1999, approximately 
twenty-five deputy sheriffs, investigators and sergeants in CIS units were assigned a 
County vehicle for use during their tours of duty and to travel to and from work and 
home. Some of those employees did not take the vehicles home but instead left them at 
the end of their shifts at the zone located nearest to their homes. 
3The employees represented by the Association include deputy sheriff assistant 
court security supervisor, deputy sheriff senior court security, deputy sheriff court 
security, deputy sheriff civil, deputy sheriff assistant supervisor-civil, deputy sheriff jailor, 
deputy sheriff jailor corporal, deputy sheriff jailor sergeant, deputy sheriff patrol, deputy 
sheriff sergeant patrol and deputy sheriff investigator. 
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As is apparent from the unit descriptions above, the unit employees in CIS are 
involved in various areas of law enforcement of a serious nature. They are deputy 
sheriffs, sergeants, and investigators and many are subject to be Called in to work at 
any time, to respond to calls from various geographical locations in the county and to 
partieipate4n4nvestigations-or operate 
workday. 
In June 1997, Captain Maureen Chisholm assumed command of the CIS. In 
March 1998, in response to a request from the Sheriff, she undertook a review of the 
vehicles assigned to CIS and their use by the individuals to whom they were assigned. 
She reported to the Sheriff in a March 18, 1998 memorandum that approximately 
thirteen named individuals had County vehicles assigned to them, some which were 
taken home by the individual and some which were driven to the zone nearest the 
employee's home. Her notations on the memorandum reflect that the vehicles were 
assigned "due to frequent activation on call" and, with respect to the vice squad and two 
task forces, that an unidentified number of undercover vehicles were taken home by 
employees involved in those operations.4 In June 1998, the Sheriff also issued a 
memorandum to Chief Deputy Douglas Nordquist directing him to look into the vehicle 
situation. Nordquist thereafter coordinated his efforts with those of Chisholm. 
4The record reflects that the undercover vehicles are taken home so that they are 
not parked in identifiable CIS parking spots in downtown Rochester lest they be 
identified as vehicles assigned to the Sheriff, which would render them useless in 
undercover work. 
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A subsequent memorandum dated June 29, 1998, from Chisholm to the 
Undersheriff, Patrick O'Flynn, gave a more detailed description of the vehicle 
assignments and the reasons therefor. For example, Chisholm stressed that in the vice 
unit, overtime had decreased significantly by allowing officers to take cars home due to 
t-he-FeduGtJon4n-GaJI-out4ime^Chishol-m4urther-noted4hat4h-e-CiS-empl0y-ees-had-been 
willing to flex their hours as a result of being given the limited use of County vehicles. 
In October 1998, Nordquist sent an even more detailed memorandum to the 
Undersheriff providing a count of employees who drove County vehicles back and forth 
to work or left vehicles at one of the zones. There were twenty-six vehicles listed with 
either the assigned individuals or squads named. The reasons given for the 
assignments varied from "on-call" to "prior agreement" to "response/marine-SWAT". 
Nordquist noted that if the Sheriff wanted to operate from the premise that "no vehicle 
leave headquarters after hours", then those cars that have been taken back and forth 
from zone to zone for the employees' "convenience and transportation" should be 
immediately suspended (emphasis in the original). However, Nordquist also 
recommended that certain employees retain the use of County vehicles because of the 
demands of their jobs. He noted that the adjusted policy would result in ten fewer 
vehicles leaving headquarters each day and that he had discussed his proposed policy 
with Chisholm but that he had delayed implementation pending the Sheriffs response. 
In late November or early December 1998, Nordquist and Chisholm met with the 
Sheriff to discuss the assignment of vehicles to various CIS employees. At that time, 
the Sheriff articulated a concern about the efficiency and economy of the current plan, 
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the impact on the taxpayer and the fairness of assigning vehicles to a relatively small 
number of employees when there were many other Department employees working in 
the downtown area who were not assigned County vehicles. 
On December 3, 1998, Nordquist sent a memorandum to all CIS employees who 
weFe-using-Gou-niy-vehiGles4o-d4ve4o-a-nd4Fom-home-or404he-nearest-zone-asking 
each to provide him with a justification for their current status. The responses to the 
memorandum received in December by Nordquist listed a variety of reasons for the 
employees to retain the use of a County vehicle. Frequently, a reduction in response 
time in arriving on the scene and a reduction in call-out time with a concomitant 
reduction in overtime was noted. Other reasons were the maintenance of the vehicles' 
status as an unidentifiable undercover car, the congestion in the downtown parking 
facility, a savings to the Department of parking fees, the ability to leave certain safety or 
investigative equipment in a vehicle left at a zone so that it is always ready for "direct 
scene response", disparity in salary for similar positions, and the ability to respond to 
incidents on the way to and from work. For some employees who are always on-call, 
the use of a vehicle was noted to be a convenience and a compensation for their 
agreement to be on-call. 
Nordquist shared the survey results with Chisholm and Flynn. The Sheriff 
received the report in January or early February 1999. In March 1999, the Sheriff 
decided to discontinue the assignment of some vehicles to CIS staff. The decision was 
verbally communicated to Chisholm, who, in turn, relayed the information to CIS 
employees on or about March 25, 1999. 
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Flex-Time 
Prior to 1999, flex-time as utilized in the vice and warrants units of CIS took two 
different forms.5 As testified to by Chisholm, 
if...it was Monday and we had a deal going Tuesday and the 
deal couldn't take place till 7:00 p.m., we would move the 
— shift-on-Tuesd-ayto-encompass-that-buyy-so-we-Gould-do-that — 
buy, so we might work noon to eight that day. That's one 
form. Another form would be, there are times when we don't 
have the election for planning for a deal in advance, so we'd 
be working a normal day and the sergeant would [tell me 
that we had a deal that night.] What we would do is, I would 
ask the members if they would flex, which meant would they 
work the deal and then take time and one half off at a later 
date. And that was totally up to them. 
Flex-time as is described above came about under Chisholm's command by at 
least 1998, when she was looking into ways to cut the overtime in the vice unit. In 
discussions with unit employees who did not want to change their nine-to-five shifts to 
later shifts, for example, eleven-to-seven, it was agreed that the employees, where 
possible, would adjust their schedules to meet the demands of an investigation and 
would thus avoid incurring overtime. 
In January and February 1999, Sergeant Daniel Finnerty, president of the 
Association, began receiving complaints that there had been a change in the way flex-
time was being handled in CIS. Employees informed him that there were now occasions 
when they reported for work at the start of their shifts and were told to go home and 
report back later for an investigation. Additionally, when the employees put in for 
Employees in the arson, identification, major crimes and white-collar crimes 
units did not participate in flex-time. 
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overtime for time actually worked, their requests were not being paid and were being 
converted into compensatory time to be utilized later at the Employer's discretion. 
Also in January 1999, a question was raised by the sergeants about how the 
flex-time was to be entered into the employees' time record books when it became 
evident to Chisholm4hatnotalLsergeantswere_recording-flex^time_in4he-same-way. 
Chisholm testified that there was an agreement reached to record flex-time as "SD" or 
"special detail" time in the record books. 
Finnerty was investigating the flex-time issue and learned about the manner in 
which flex-time was being recorded by the sergeants. He met with Flynn in March 1999 
and Flynn agreed at that time that flex-time would stop and there would be no 
retaliation taken against CIS personnel for complaining about the changes in the way 
flex-time had been utilized in the past. 
During this time frame, Chisholm expressed her concern to CIS employees that 
the time record books had been reviewed by the Association and also that employees 
had not come directly to her with their complaints about flex-time. On March 26, 1999, a 
meeting took place between Finnerty, Nordquist and Chisholm. At the meeting, both 
flex-time and the use of County vehicles were discussed. Finnerty's version of the 
meeting was that agreement to flex-time was tied to use of County vehicles. Nordquist's 
testimony was that the two were separate issues and that the review of the use of 
County vehicles had been prompted by the Sheriffs concerns about the "fairness" of 
the assignment of the vehicles to only certain CIS employees. Nordquist did indicate, 
however, that if the Association could come to some agreement on flex-time, perhaps 
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he and Chisholm would be able to approach the Sheriff about reinstating the prior 
practice with respect to the use of County vehicles.6 
DISCUSSION 
It has long been held that the benefit of the use of an employer-owned vehicle by 
an-employee-during-the-workday-andJo-driveJo and-from-work-is-a4erm-and-condition 
of employment and, therefore, a mandatory subject of negotiations.7 The ALJ found that 
there was sufficient evidence in the record that the use of County-owned vehicles by 
employees in the CIS units was conditional in nature and when the condition precedent 
to the use of the vehicles was no longer present, the use of the vehicles could be 
withdrawn by the County without negotiations.8 We do not agree with the ALJ's finding. 
The record reveals that there were many reasons that vehicles were assigned to 
CIS employees, such as many CIS employees being subject to be called-in while off-
duty, a longer response time to call-ins or emergencies if these employees were 
required to go to the downtown parking lot to obtain a County vehicle for response, and 
that some vehicles used in undercover work cannot be left in the Department parking 
'The ALJ, based upon her credibility resolutions, discredited some of Chisholm's 
testimony in favor of that of Finnerty and Nordquist. 
7County of Nassau, 13 PERB |f3095 (1980), affg 13 PERB 1J4570 (1980), cont'd, 
14 PERB fl7017 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981), affd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB 1J7012 
(2d Dep't 1982), motion for leave to appeal denied, 57 NY2d 601,15 PERB 1J7015 
(1982); County of Onondaga, 12 PERB 1J3035 (1979), cont'd, 11 AD2d 783, 13 PERB 
1J7011 (4th Dep't 1980); County of Cattaraugus, 8 PERB 1J3062 (1975). 
See County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3034 (1999). 
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areas lest the anonymity of the cars be compromised.9 All those conditions still exist in 
the Department. For example, one employee testified that he was assigned a vehicle to 
be used when he was called out after hours, which is illustrative of the reasons for the 
use of cars. Another employee testified that upon being called out, he agreed that he 
would-only-request compensation for_theJime-actually_worked_instead-oithe^—^ ^ 
contractually provided minimum of 2.7 hours of overtime. This does not impose a 
condition on either him or others represented by the Association which justifies the 
unilateral cessation of the practice of assigning County-owned vehicles to CIS 
employees. There is no record evidence that any employee has reverted to the 
contractually guaranteed overtime benefit or, that if he or she had, the Employer would 
be privileged to withdraw the benefit from all the other CIS employees who had no such 
condition imposed upon their use of County-owned vehicles. 
We, therefore, reverse the ALJ and find that the Employer has violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally discontinuing the past practice of allowing CIS 
employees to use County-owned vehicles during the day and to drive to and from work. 
The ALJ determined that the Employer violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act 
because she found that the Sheriff would not have rescinded the assignment of County-
owned vehicles to many CIS employees who had been using them during the workday 
and to drive to and from work "but for" the Association's objection to the manner in 
which flex-time was being utilized by the Department in 1999. The ALJ relied heavily on 
9ln fact, two employees testified that there were no conditions attached to their 
use of County cars. 
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the fact that the Sheriffs decision to restrict the use of County vehicles followed closely 
upon the Association's complaints to Flynn about the manner in which the CIS 
employees were being compelled to change their schedules and to then take 
compensatory time at the Employer's discretion. The ALJ also found the Employer's 
proffered-business reasonsto-be^pretextual,— ——-= —— 
It is well-settled that the elements necessary to prove a case of discrimination for 
union activity under the Act are that the affected individual was engaged in protected 
activity, that such activity was known to the person(s) making the adverse employment 
decision, and that the action would not have been taken but for the protected activity. 
The existence of anti-union animus may be established by statements or by 
circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by presentation of legitimate business 
reasons for the action taken, unless found to be pretextual.10 
Here, there is no dispute that the Association was engaged in protected activity 
when Finnerty went to Flynn about the method of flex-time being utilized in the CIS 
units in 1999. There is also no dispute that Chisholm, Nordquist and Flynn were aware 
of the concerns of the CIS employees as articulated by Finnerty. The Sheriff was made 
aware of the practice of utilizing flex-time in certain CIS units to help alleviate overtime 
because Chisholm and Nordquist articulated the employees' willingness to use flex-time 
when they argued to the Sheriff that the assignment of vehicles to employees in those 
10Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES, 32 PERB P079 (1999); Town of Independence, 
23 PERB 1J3020 (1990). See also State of New York (Div. of Human Rights), 22 PERB 
113036(1989). 
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units should be continued. There is, however, no record evidence that the Sheriff was 
aware of the Association's complaints and the abolition of flex-time by Flynn as a 
response to Finnerty's articulated concerns. While the record evidences that Chisholm 
was not happy that the Association had complained about flex-time to Flynn, there is no 
evidence that-she-GommuniGated-her-feelings-about4he-AssoGiation-s-GonGerns4o4he-~ 
Sheriff. Indeed, the record evidences that both Chisholm and Nordquist supported the 
assignment of County vehicles to CIS employees and made that support known to both 
Flynn and the Sheriff. 
There is no evidence, save the timing of the Sheriff's decision to discontinue the 
practice of assigning County-owned vehicles, which would support a conclusion that the 
Sheriff would not have changed the practice with respect to the use of County vehicles 
but for the Association's complaints about flex-time as it was then being utilized. The 
Sheriff, however, began his inquiries into the use of County-owned vehicles as early as 
1997. The final report on the review of the assignments by Chisholm and Nordquist 
were not given to the Sheriff until January or February 1999. The fact that the Sheriff 
took a month to come to a decision on reports that had taken over a year to compile 
does not stretch the imagination. Nor does it compel a finding that the Sheriff reached 
his decision on the vehicles at the same time as flex-time was abolished by Flynn 
because the Sheriff was retaliating against the Association. As we have stated before, 
timing alone is insufficient to establish a finding of animus.11 
"Rockville Ctr. Union Free Sen. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3050 (1999); Town of North 
Hempstead, 32 PERB 1J3006 (1999). 
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In fact, Nordquist made it plain in his statements to Finnerty that the two issues 
were separate. That both he and Chisholm hoped to use the employees' willingness to 
utilize flex-time to reduce overtime costs and response time to calls, as well as the other 
reasons they articulated for the continuation of the practice of allowing employees to 
use^County-owned-vehicles,4o^convince4he-Sheriff4o^continue-or-reinstate4he-practice 
does not support a finding that the two issues were linked or that the reasons for 
eliminating the practice with respect to County-owned vehicles attributed to the Sheriff 
by Chisholm and Nordquist were pretextual. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision that the Employer 
violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act when it unilaterally discontinued the past 
practice of allowing employees in CIS units to use County-owned vehicles to travel to 
and from work. The specifications in the charge alleging a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and 
(c) are, therefore, dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Employer: 
1. Forthwith restore the benefit of the use of County-owned vehicles 
for travel to and from home or to and from the zones to those CIS 
employees represented by the Association who previously had 
such vehicles assigned to them; 
2. Make whole all CIS employees represented by the Association for any 
parking and/or other expenses incurred by driving personal vehicles to 
and from home and to and from the zones, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate from March 25, 1999; 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations customarily used 
to communicate with employees in the unit represented by the 
Association. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
MichaelR. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
— NEW-YORICSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff (Employer) in the unit 
represented by the Monroe County Sheriff Police Benevolent Association that the Employer will: 
1. Forthwith restore the benefit of the use of County-owned vehicles for travel to and 
from home or to and from the zones to those CIS employees represented by the 
Association who previously had such vehicles assigned to them. 
2. Make whole all CIS employees represented by the Association for any parking and/or other 
expenses incurred by driving personal vehicles to and from home and to and from the 
zones, with interest at the maximum legal rate from March 25, 1999. 
Dated . . . By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF MONROE and MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GRADUATE STUDENT EMPLOYEES' UNION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20890 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK), 
Respondent. 
PETER HENNER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
i counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Graduate Student Employees' 
Union (GSEU) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge 
that the State of New York (State University of New York at Stony Brook) (SUNY) 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally rescinded its academic freedom policy by removing two teaching assistants 
from teaching English 101 and reassigning them as writing tutors due to their use in 
their Fall 1998 English 101 classes of "a syllabus and assigned readings which were 
considered controversial." SUNY argued in its answer that academic freedom derives 
from the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, as a matter of 
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constitutional rights, it is a nonmandatory subject of negotiations. The conferencing ALJ 
directed the GSEU to file an offer of proof in support of its charge. The matter was then 
assigned to a hearing ALJ who decided the case on the pleadings, the offer of proof 
and memoranda of law filed by both parties. 
The -ALJ-dismissed4he-Ghargey4inding4hatevBn4/vMn-GonstitutiQnaMssues-are^ 
raised, the negotiability of a term turns upon a balancing of the competing interests of 
the employees and the public employer. Where, as here, the employee interest is the 
manner in which a teaching assistant will perform the job function of teaching a class 
and the employer interest is the manner in which duties are to be performed, the ALJ 
held that the balance, and prior Board decisions, weighs on the side of the employer. 
GSEU argues in its exceptions that the teaching assistants' right to decide the 
appropriateness of instructional materials equates to academic freedom which is a First 
Amendment right, that SUNY may not reassign the teaching assistants because they 
exercised their discretion by teaching in a certain manner and that SUNY must 
negotiate policies alleged to violate Constitutional rights. SUNY argues that the ALJ's 
decision should be affirmed. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The facts are few and are not really in dispute. They are incorporated in the 
following discussion of the merits of the charge. 
GSEU represents graduate students employed by SUNY. In the Fall of 1998, two 
graduate students employed as teaching assistants at SUNY's Stony Brook campus 
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were transferred from their classroom teaching assignments to tutoring assignments 
because of the "controversial" nature of the curriculum and reading materials they were 
utilizing. 
GSEU asserts that SUNY has a practice of recognizing academic freedom for 
teaGhing-assistants,4hat4he-removaUand-reassignmentof-the-teaching-assistants — 
violates the concept of academic freedom and that academic freedom is a term and 
condition of employment. GSEU defines academic freedom as "freedom from retaliation 
for the manner in which a teaching professional, including a teaching assistant, 
performs his/her duties in the classroom." SUNY argues that teaching assistants are not 
faculty and are, therefore, not entitled to academic freedom and that what is at issue in 
this charge is the manner in which the teaching assistants will perform the job duty of 
teaching a class, which is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
The ALJ correctly assessed the gravamen of the charge and applied the 
appropriate case law in her decision.1 GSEU may characterize the subject matter of the 
1While SUNY characterizes the charge as relating to First Amendment issues, 
we have found that even in such cases, a balancing test must be utilized to determine 
not whether a term is constitutional or unconstitutional, but whether it is mandatory or 
nonmandatory. In some circumstances those governmental interests which make an 
action constitutional can also exempt an employer from a statutory duty to bargain 
regarding that action. But, "the factors used in assessing the constitutionality of an 
action may be different from those used in making a negotiability determination. For 
example, a constitutional analysis might include policy considerations which are not 
appropriately considered in a negotiability determination because they are divorced 
from the employment relationship. That, in part, explains why an action may be 
simultaneously constitutional yet mandatorily negotiable." Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 
PERB 1f3001, at 3007, n.9 (1992). See also Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist, 29 
PERB 1J3041 (1996). 
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charge as "academic freedom" but the facts alleged in the charge and the offer of proof 
demonstrate that what is at issue is the manner in which English 101 will be taught, 
including the choice of materials to be utilized in the classroom. We have previously 
held that the selection of textbooks, examinations and other materials goes to "the 
essenGe-of-eduGational-polioy—and-iSy-therefore^a-nonmandatory-subjeGt-of-——- — 
negotiation.2 A demand relating to changes in curricula, programs and methods has 
also been found to be nonmandatory as such a demand affects the nature and extent 
of service provided by a school district to its constituency.3 
To the extent that the charge can be read to assert that the reassignment of the 
teaching assistants from the classroom to a tutoring assignment is a separate violation, 
the ALJ correctly found that the assignment of inherent job duties is also a 
management prerogative and is nonmandatory.4 Although GSEU seems to allege in its 
brief to the ALJ and, again, in its exceptions, that the reassignment was a form of 
discipline, the ALJ correctly found that there was no allegation in the charge that the 
2Orange County Community Coll. and County of Orange, 9 PERB 1)3068, at 
3120 (1976). See also Cortland Paid Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2737, IAFF, 29 PERB 
113037(1996). 
3Somers Faculty Ass'n, 9 PERB 1[3014 (1976). 
4Waverly Cent. Sch. Dist, 10 PERB fl 3103. See also Seneca Falls Teachers 
Ass'n, 23 PERB 1J3032 (1990); Oyster Bay-East Norwich Cent. Sch. Dist, 18 PERB 
1J3075 (1985); Norwich City Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J3059 (1981). 
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reassignment was for disciplinary reasons or that the reassignment might constitute 
discipline within the meaning of the parties' contractual disciplinary procedure.5 
For the reasons set forth above, GSEU's exceptions are denied and the decision 
of the ALJ is affirmed. 
^IT-IS^-TNEREFORE^ORDERED-thaUhe-Gharge-must-be^and-it-herebyHS,— 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
MichaeLR. Cuevas, Chairman 
/John T. Mitchell, Member 
5
 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist, supra note 1. (PERB will not consider allegations not 
•
J
 raised in a charge or timely amendment.) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT JEFFERSON ADMINISTRATORS 
ASSOCIATION, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK-STATE7 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASENO.U-21128 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions from the Port Jefferson Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found 
a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) on a 
charge filed by the Port Jefferson Administrators Association, School Administrators 
Association of New York State (Association).1 
1The Association withdrew the specifications alleging violations of §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
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FACTS 
Based upon the record before us, we adopt the ALJ's findings of fact. The 
material facts are summarized as follows. Dr. Esther Fusco was an elementary school 
principal within the District until her suspension on June 29, 1999. By letter dated 
July-29H999T-the-DistrietSuperintendenVEdward-Reilly^direeted-Dr—FusGo4o return to 
work on August 2, 1999. She was to report to the high school, where she was provided 
with a desk, computer and telephone. She was directed to sign in and out whenever 
she entered or left the school. 
On September 15, 1999, charges pursuant to Education Law §3020-a were 
brought against her. She was suspended with pay from her duties as elementary 
school principal, and she was to remain at the high school where her work assignment 
remained as outlined above. 
ALJ'S DECISION 
By decision dated May 18, 2000, the ALJ found that the District violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally imposing a sign-in, sign-out requirement on Dr. 
Fusco. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepted to the ALJ's decision on two grounds: 
1. The ALJ erred in concluding the District violated the Act because the ALJ 
failed to properly apply the balancing test in determining whether an 
administrative work rule constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining; and 
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2. The ALJ erred in concluding the District's defense could not be predicated 




negotiation unless it has but a slight impact upon terms and conditions of employment 
or it has a major impact upon managerial responsibilities that, by law or public policy, 
may not be shared.2 While the sign-in, sign-out requirements were imposed by the 
District pursuant to pending §3020-a charges, Education Law §3020-a is silent with 
regard to the manner in which a school district may impose restrictions upon a 
^ suspended employee. 
We have held that employers have the managerial right to maintain a record of 
attendance and presence of their employees. However, an employer may not, without . 
the agreement of the employees' negotiating representative, require its employees to 
participate in the recording process.3 As there is nothing in Education Law §3020-a 
which would mandate a contrary conclusion, we find that, on balance, the attendance 
requirement imposed upon Dr. Fusco primarily impacted the conditions of her 
employment and is mandatorily negotiable. 
The District also argues that the sign-in directive is nonmandatory because it 
encompasses the facts specific to the discipline of Dr. Fusco. We disagree. As the ALJ 
2See Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, New York, Inc., 13 PERB 1J3082 (1980), 
.) citing Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 636 F2d 550, 89 LC fl12,207 (D.C. Circ. 1980); see 
also State of New York (Unified Court System), 33 PERB fl (October 6, 2000). 
3Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist, 20 PERB 1J3053 (1987). 
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correctly pointed out, we rejected this negotiability approach in State of New York 
(Department of Transportation)4 and its progeny.5 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the decision 
oftheALJ. 
IT-IS^T-HEREFQRE^QRDERED-that-the-Distriet-shall^ 
1. Forthwith rescind its directives of July 29, and September 1, 1999, 
requiring that Dr. Fusco sign in and sign out; 
2. Delete from all files any references to her failure to follow the 
directives referred to in paragraph 1, above; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used 
to post notices to unit members. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
/ 
427 PERB fl3056 (1994). 
5See State of New York, 31 PERB TJ3018 (1998); City of Glens Falls, 30 PERB 
H3047 (1997); Town ofCarmel, 29 PERB P026 (1996). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the Port Jefferson Union Free School District (District) represented 
by the Port Jefferson Administrators Association, School Administrators Association of New York, that 
the District shall: 
) 1) Rescind its directives of July 29 and September 1,1999 requiring that Esther 
Fusco sign in and sign out; 
2) Delete from all files any reference to her failure to follow the directives 
referred to in paragraph 1, above. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Port Jefferson Union Free School District 
/'his Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF'S POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., AFFILIATED WITH THE 
POLICE CONFERENCE OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Cfrarging~Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21622 
COUNTY OF ERIE and SHERIFF OF THE 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondents. 
BOHL, DELLA ROCCA & DORFMAN, P.C. (JAMES B. TUTTLE of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BRIAN D. DOYLE, ESQ., for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Erie County Sheriff's Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc., affiliated with the Police Conference of New York, Inc. 
(SBA), to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing its improper practice charge alleging that the County of Erie 
(County) and Sheriff of the County of Erie (Sheriff) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when 
the Sheriff required unit members requesting contractual union leave to provide an 
explanation for the request resulting in the denial of certain requests because the 
Sheriff disapproved of the stated explanation. 
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The SBA's charge was dismissed as deficient by the Director. He found that the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement was the SBA's arguable source of right with 
respect to the subject matter of the charge. 
The SBA excepts to the Director's decision on the ground that the Director failed 
to-eonsider-the practice alleged-in-the charge. 
Based on our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the Director's decision. 
FACTS 
The salient facts alleged in the amended charge filed on May 9, 2000 are as 
follows: 
Details of Charge 
Article XIV, Section 4 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
entitled Union Leave provides: 
(A) Members of the Union who are elected or designated to 
attend any Convention, Seminars, Educational Forums 
and/or official meeting of the Local Union Executive Board or 
official meeting of the Executive Board of the International 
Union, shall be permitted to attend such functions and be 
granted the necessary time off work permitting without loss 
of either time or pay provided that the total said time is not in 
excess of sixty (60) work days in any calendar year and 
further provided that a request for such leave is made by the 
Union in writing to the Sheriff or his designee no less than 
five (5) calendar days prior to the date that the particular 
function is scheduled. Any request for such union leave 
shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Prior to Patrick Gallivan taking office as Sheriff of the County of 
Erie, his predecessor in office simply allowed the Union its sixty 
(60) union days with no prior requirement other than the five (5) 
days written notice. 
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After Sheriff Gallivan took office that remained the practice for a 
substantial period of time. 
However, in December 1999, Sheriff Gallivan began a practice 
of requiring an explanation of the nature, purpose and subject 
matter of the request for Union leave off and also of denying 
requested Union leave on the grounds that he disapproved of the 
subject matter. 
This unilateral change from the past practice by the Sheriff has 
interfered with the right of the Union to operate independently and 
in privacy . . . and has thereby violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act.1 
On May 10, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director), by letter, informed counsel for the SBA that the 
charge, as amended, was deficient because "[t]he union's source of right to union 
leave, not to 'unreasonably withheld', is Article XIV, section 4 of the parties' 'in force' 
contract. PERB lacks jurisdiction to enforce contract provisions." 
On May 26, 2000, counsel for the SBA, by letter, advised the Assistant Director 
to "recommend to the Director. . . that the matter be dismissed so that we may file 
exceptions pursuant to §204.10(c) of the Rules."2 
DISCUSSION 
The SBA urges us to retain jurisdiction over this charge because the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement is silent regarding the dispute. The County and Sheriff 
1Charge, 1J5. 
2Note: effective July 21, 1999, pursuant to amendment of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), §204.10 was reserved for future use. Provisions of the Rules 
referring to filing exceptions are now set forth in §213. 
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in their response to the SBA's exceptions argue that the SBA has filed a contract 
grievance thereby acknowledging that the contract is the SBA's source of right. 
In Maine-Endwell Central School District, we dealt with the inevitable conflict that 
occurs when an employer unilaterally changes a past practice that may also be covered 
by4he-parties-eolleetive bargaining agreementTMA/ethere-affirmed-theALJ-s dismissal 
of the charge on the ground that the actions taken by the District were authorized by the 
language of the collective bargaining agreement. As the ALJ stated: 
[T]he Association misunderstands the employer's obligation, which 
is to refrain from unilaterally changing not a practice, but a term 
and condition of employment. When a contract is silent on a 
particular item, the past practice of the parties may be examined to 
determine the term and condition, (citation omitted) But when the 
parties have negotiated and reached an agreement on the item, 
the contract then defines the term and condition of employment, 
and actions taken pursuant thereto can no longer be labeled 
unilateral. In essence, the parties have, for the duration of the 
contract, waived their right to complain about such actions.4 
The issues raised by the SBA's exceptions do not take this matter outside of our 
decision in State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations),5 because the 
practice of granting union leave was within the perimeters of the language of 
Article XIV. We have held that §205.5(d) of the Act divests us of jurisdiction in a failure 
to bargain charge where, as here, the parties' [contract] provides the charging party 
with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject matter of the 
315 PERB 1J3025 (1982), aff'g 14 PERB 1J4625 (1981). 
4/cf. at 4759. 
533 PERB H3012(2000). 
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reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject matter of the charge.6 
This is the case even where, as we held in City of Troy, "the contours of the charging 
party's contract rights and the respondent's corresponding obligations need not be laid 
out in any detail to trigger the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d)."7 
After-reviewing-the-amended-Gharge-Gontaining-the-language of-Article-XIV-of-the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement, we agree with the Director's decision. 
Article XIV covers union leave and states that any request for such leave was not to be 
unreasonably withheld. Consequently, the contract represents a reasonably arguable 
source of right to the SBA such as to divest us of jurisdiction. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the SBA's exceptions and affirm the 
Director's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
^ 
't/U*^A/is& 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
6
'County of Nassau, 25 PERB 1J3071 (1992). 
728 PERB 1J3057, at 3131 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20917 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
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WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to the decision of the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) which found that 
the State of New York (State) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when the State Education Department (SED) discontinued 
and blocked all computer-generated e-mail of one of its employees, Michael Darcy, who 
was also an official of the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). 
The Assistant Director found that Darcy was involved in protected activity as a 
member of PEF's labor-management team within SED, that SED was aware of his 
union status, that Darcy was directing e-mail to PEF members within SED and that SED 
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discontinued and blocked Darcy's use of the SED computer-generated e-mail system 
because Darcy was critical of certain elected and appointed officials at a time when the 
State and PEF were embroiled in negotiations over a successor contract. 
The State excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing that the Assistant 
Director-erred in-his-interpretation of-the faets-and the4aw—PEF^in its-response^ 
supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
FACTS 
We will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions filed by 
the State. 
Sometime in 1994, during the course of a labor/management meeting, the issue 
of whether PEF members would be able to use the OFIS e-mail system at SED to 
contact its membership was first raised. SED thereafter developed a policy to permit 
PEF to post PEF-related activities that were determined to be a benefit and/or of 
interest to the agency. We note that this policy was never reduced to writing and none 
of the witnesses was able to determine when in 1994 it was developed and thereafter 
implemented. 
In 1996, the OFIS e-mail system was replaced with the Groupwise e-mail 
system. On or about August 8, 1996, Richard Cate, SED's chief operating officer, sent 
a memo to all employees advising them of SED's policy that the appropriate use of its 
e-mail system was to solely support SED business.1 As Cate testified, and consistent 
Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. 
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with the 1996 policy memo, he allowed exceptions to the business purpose policy for 
PEF communications consistent with the 1994 policy. This policy was again published 
on August 21, 19982 and remained in effect as of the date of the charge. Darcy was 
aware of SED's e-mail policy.3 
During-1998^Darey bfoadcasMhe-eventsof the-PEF-delegates conventionT-This 
message was received by SED's labor relations specialist, Roswith Apkarian. For her, 
this represented the first time Darcy transgressed the SED's policy. Several months 
passed and in early 1999, Apkarian was made aware that Darcy had broadcast 
electronically the PEF newsletter, the Spark. Subsequently, in March 1999, the parties 
met in a labor/management forum to discuss, among other things, the appropriate use 
of SED e-mail; however, there was no resolution of this issue. After the meeting in 
March 1999, the use of SED's e-mail system to communicate with PEF members on a 
variety of topics became a source of concern for SED management. 
On April 12, 1999, the State sent a memo to all agency heads reiterating that 
employees may not use state equipment for any use other than departmental business. 
On May 5, 1999, Cate advised all employees of SED that he had notified the leaders of 
PEF and CSEAof the State's memo and republished SED's e-mail policy. 
Darcy continued to use SED's e-mail system to communicate with PEF members 
on subjects outside of the policy guidelines. On or about May 21, 1999, Cate and SED's 
Respondent's Amended Answer, Exhibit B. 
3Transcript, p. 73. 
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Human Resource Director, Charles Byrne, met with Darcy and another PEF 
representative, and they restated SED's e-mail policy to Darcy, told him he was 
violating the policy and they wanted it stopped. 
On May 21, 1999, Darcy e-mailed Bryne and advised him that PEF's position 
was-unehanged-He-explained-t-ha-t-(-1 )-the-use of-e-mail-at-SED-had-developed-i-n-to-a— 
practice and any change would require negotiations; (2) the current collective 
bargaining agreement between PEF and the State prohibits the use of State resources 
only for internal union business such as union business elections, which PEF supported 
because if State resources could be used in PEF internal business, the State could 
meddle in PEF internal matters by controlling or manipulating the use of such 
resources; (3) the State's memo of April 22, 1999 was the subject of an improper 
practice charge and pending its resolution, PEF would continue to operate as before; 
and (4) that he could not conform to Byrne's request to stop violating SED's e-mail 
policy.4 
On May 25, 1999, Cate notified Darcy that he was disconnecting his e-mail 
access at SED. On June 8,1999, PEF filed the original charge in this proceeding. On 
June 24, 1999, the parties met in a labor/management forum to discuss the termination 
of PEF's (Darcy's) use of SED e-mail, among other things. On July 15, 1999, PEF filed 
an amended charge alleging that SED blocked Darcy's access to PEF employees at 
SED through the use of his home computer. 
) 4PEF Exhibit No. 4. 
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DISCUSSION 
PEF charged that SED interfered with Darcy's protected right to communicate 
with other PEF members regarding union issues, e.g. contract negotiations, and that 
SED took away Darcy's e-mail privileges to punish him for the content of his e-mail 
messages^ -—^ 
We have held that in order to establish improper motivation under §§209-a.1 (a) 
and (c) of the Act, a charging party must prove that (a) he/she had been engaged in 
protected activities, (b) the respondent had knowledge of, and (c) acted because of 
those activities.5 If the charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that its actions were 
motivated by legitimate business reasons.6 
We have held that the charging party can establish "[t]he existence of anti-union 
animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
presentation of legitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless found to be 
5Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1989). See also Convention Ctr. 
Operating Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB 1J3067 (1995), conf'd, 
234 AD2d 640, 29 PERB H7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
e
'City ofSalamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). See also City of Albany, 3 PERB 
H4507, aff'd, 3 PERB 1J3096 (1970), conf'd in pertinent part, 36 AD2d 348, 4 PERB 
1J7008 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB 1J7000 (1972). 
Board - U-20917 -6 
pretextual".7 Proof that the employer's stated reasons for its conduct are pretextual may 
constitute such circumstantial evidence.8 
It is uncontroverted that the administration at SED was well-aware of Darcy's 
involvement in PEF. SED and PEF met regularly in labor/management forums and 
Darcy aeted-in4he-eapaeity-ofa-PEF-representativein-these-diseussions^Fhe- — 
Assistant Director concluded that the dissemination of information relating to legislation 
and negotiations is a protected activity even if critical of the employer's conduct.9 
PEF meets the first two prongs of the test because Darcy was acting in his 
capacity as a PEF representative at the time the e-mail was sent out on the SED 
system and SED management was aware of Darcy's PEF membership and his position 
with PEF in labor/management forums. 
However, we disagree with the Assistant Director that there is record evidence 
that Cate's decision to remove Darcy's e-mail capability at SED was improperly 
motivated. 
We have held that the fundamental right of an employee to participate in the 
activities of the employee organization of his choosing with the employer's right to 
maintain order and respect must be balanced one against the other.10 "On occasion, 
7Town of Independence, supra note 5 at 3038; See also Convention Ctr. 
Operating Corp., 29 PERB fl3022 (1996); City of Rye, supra note 5. 
8See CityofUtica, 24 PERB 1J3044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB ff4605, 
aff'd, 28 PERB P079 (1995). 
9See Binghamton City Sch. Dist, 22 PERB 1J3034 (1989). 
wState of New York (Ben Aaman), 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978). 
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the [union] representative may engage in impulsive behavior that an employer would 
not have to tolerate from an employee who is engaged in his normal tasks. Although 
an employer may not ordinarily discipline the employee representative for such 
behavior, there are circumstances in which overzealous behavior on his part may 
Gonstitute-misGonduGt^^Gonsequently^inappropriate-GonduGVevenHf-part-of-a-union 
activity which is protected, will not shield an employee from its consequences.12 
It is uncontroverted through both parties' witnesses that SED met regularly with 
PEF in their labor/management committees to discuss various issues, including PEF's 
use of SED's e-mail system. In later meetings, Darcy's use of the SED e-mail system 
became the focus of their discussions. This is in conformity with the letter and the spirit 
of the Act.13 Although the parties failed to agree on this issue, Cate's position regarding 
PEF's use of SED's e-mail system remained consistent. Cate directed Darcy to cease 
using SED's e-mail for purposes beyond the previously agreed upon perimeters of 
e-mail usage. It is Darcy's refusal to comply with Cate's directive that prompted the 
action taken against Darcy, not Cate's feelings about the content of Darcy's e-mails. 
We believe that the Assistant Director erred in crediting Darcy's and Kolowitz' 
testimony over Cate. A fair reading of the transcript revealed that both Darcy and 
11/d. at 3137. See also NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F2d 584 (7th Cir. 
1965). 
^Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3022 (1994); State of New York 
(OMRDD), 24 PERB P036 (1991); Island Trees Public Schs., 14 PERB 1J3020 (1981). 
See also Earle Industries v. NLRB, 75 F3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996). 
13Act, §204.3. 
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Kolowitz had a selective memory regarding significant facts and events. For example, 
Darcy denied under cross-examination that he had ever discussed Cate's objections 
with Byrne prior to Darcy's last meeting with Cate. Darcy's testimony was contradicted 
by PEF's own exhibit 4.14 At their last meeting, Cate requested that Darcy cease using 
4he-SED-e-mail-system^-DarGyaGknowledges4his request in the-Gonfirming e-mail 
sent on May 21, 1999.16 PEF offers no explanation for Darcy's refusal to comply with 
Cate's request. We have held that the appropriate response to an objectionable 
directive is to comply and seek redress through available legal channels.17 We find, 
therefore, that Darcy's refusal to comply with Cate's request was tantamount to 
misconduct, even though clothed in protected activity.18 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we find no evidence of anti-union animus and we reverse the Assistant 
Director's decision on the merits. 
; 
14Transcript, pp. 67-68, PEF Exhibit 4. 
15Transcript, pp. 132-133. 
16PEF Exhibit 4. 
uSee Farmingdale Union Free School Dist, 11 PERB 1J3055 (1978). 
18P/ante v. Buono, 172 AD2d 81 (3d Dep't 1991), appeal denied, 79 NY2d 756 
(1992). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
New York, New York 
^L t&Z ' ^ ^ 4 ^ U L X / ^ C ^ C O £ ^ S >SSt—~3 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARLBOROUGH TOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5001 
TOWN OF MARLBOROUGH, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
) 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Marlborough Town Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
Certification - C-5001 page 2 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
— Included^ AU-pa-Ft-time-BMP-certified-police officers
 : 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Marlborough Town Police Benevolent Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other ternns and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 




John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 693, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5008 
TOWN OF MCDONOUGH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 693 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time MEOs. 
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Excluded: Supervisors and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 693. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes-the-mutuaUobligationto-meetat reasonable times-and-confer-in-goodTaith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
>'Ui 
Michaej R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, — 
-and- CASE NO. C-4780 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police Officers, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
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public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included^ Investigative-Aidel (NarcoticsXJnvestigative-Aide IL(Narcotics), 
Investigative Aide ill (Narcotics). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police Officers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
'{A-SUsl/UK 
\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ivlafc A^bbortTMeniber 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4995 
TOWN OF LEWISTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
LEWISTON POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 264 has been designated and 
\ 1 This unit has been represented by the Lewiston PBA, who notified PERB that it 
~~J supports the petition and disclaims any interest in further representing the unit. 
i 
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selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included^ AII4uil4i-me-and-regular_part=time-p-oJ.ice officers employedJjyihe-
Town of Lewiston. 
Excluded: Police chief, corporals, sergeants, clerical, administrative staff, 
officers assigned to the court, and all non-sworn officers. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 264. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
VLA&U 
MichaehR. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Jo'hn T. Mitchell, Member 
X I 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
—: Petitioner-
-and- CASE NO. C-5005 
COUNTY OF LIVINGSTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All part-time permanent (as defined by New York State Civil 
Service Law) and all full-time or part-time seasonal positions (as 
defined by New York State Civil Service Law) employed by 
Livingston County in the job titles set forth below within the 
County's Skilled Nursing Facilities, Office for the Aging, Public 
Health Department, Department of Social Services, Records 
Management-Department,-Cou-n-ty-H-isto-rian^s-Office.-O-ffice-O-f 
Central Services, Highway Department and Conesus Lake Sewer 
District. 
Permanent Positions (Livingston County Civil Service Title): 
Clerk/Typist, Clerk, Typist, Account Clerk, Account Clerk/Typist, 
Licensed Practical Nurse, Registered Professional Nurse, Nursing 
Assistant, Pharmacist, Charge Nurse, Personal Care Assistant, 
Activities Aide, Laundry Worker, Cleaner, Housekeeper, Building 
Maintenance Person, Courier, Senior Nutrition Program Site 
Manager, Aging Services Caseworker, Foster Grandparent 
Assistant, Food Service Helper, Ombudsman Coordinator, Home 
Health Aide, Senior Public Health Engineer, Case Worker, 
Registered Physician's Assistant, Public Health Educator, Hospice 
Volunteer Coordinator, Public Health Social Worker, Nutrition Aide, 
Clinical Aide, Public Health Technician, Deputy County Historian, 
Records Inventory Clerk, and Custodial Worker. 
Seasonal: 
Motor Equipment Operator I, Laborer, Home Energy Assistance 
Program Examiner, and Summer Camp Worker. 
Excluded: Positions within the bargaining unit represented by the New York 
State Nurses Association, positions within the existing Civil Service 
Employees Association, Livingston County Local 826 Unit, 
temporary employees as defined by the New York State Civil 
Service Law and substitute employees, as defined below. 
Substitute employees are all employees who are hired to perform 
work during the absences of other employees, so long as the 
period of substitution does not exceed 300 hours in a calendar 
year; provided that no employees in the nursing departments of the 
Skilled Nursing Facilities shall be considered to be substitute 
employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO,. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet atreasonableJimes-and-confer-in^goodJaith_with_respecLto wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
(StXAzAWi 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5010 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: Regularly scheduled full-time and part-time Group Leader and 
Assistant Leader working in the South Huntington Childcare 
Program. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURXHER,-ITlIS-ORDERED-that4he-above_named^publicemployer_shallL 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 6, 2000 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitcheii, Member 
J 
